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COMMENT 
ADJUSTING THE ASYLUM BAR: 
NEGUSIE V. HOLDER AND THE 
NEED TO INCORPORATE A 
DEFENSE OF DURESS INTO THE 
"PERSECUTOR BAR" 
INTRODUCTION 
As a prisoner in Eritrea/ Daniel Negusie was forced to roll 
around on the ground in the hot sun for hours on end, beaten 
with sticks if he stopped, and told that he would be killed if he 
continued to practice his new found Protestant religion. 2 After 
several years of incarceration, Negusie was forced to stand 
guard over other prisoners as they were subjected to extreme 
sun exposure and intense heat, while armed guards patrolled 
the area.3 Knowing the prisoners could possibly die from the 
exposure, Negusie tried to sneak them water.4 Later, after 
fleeing to the United States, Negusie was denied asylum 
because the Board of Immigration Appeals held that he had 
participated in the persecution of his fellow prisoners when he 
involuntarily worked as a prison guard.5 
1 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: ERITREA (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/r/paieilbgn/2854.htm#geo. The State of Eritrea is located in the 
Horn of Africa, bordered by Sudan, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. 
2 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1162-63 (2009); see also id. at 1177 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
3 Id. at 1163 (majority opinion). 
4 Id. at 1177 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
5 Id. at 1163 (majority opinion). 
235 
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The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)6 automatically 
bars an alien from obtaining refugee status in the United 
States if he or she "assisted, or otherwise participated in the 
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion."? The United States Supreme Court, in 
Negusie v. Holder, recently concluded that it is unclear 
whether the INA contains an exception for persecution that 
occurred while the "persecutor" was under duress.s Before 
Negusie, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)9 enforced a 
policy automatically barring asylumlO to claimants such as 
Negusie who had participated in the persecution of others, 
regardless of whether the persecution was coerced or the 
product of duress. 11 
This Comment explores the different interpretations of the 
"persecutor bar" among the circuits and proposes an exception 
for those who have persecuted others while under duress. 12 
Part I begins with the background and policy reasons behind 
6 The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the definition of refugee in the INA. 
Throughout this Comment, references to the persecutor bar in the Refugee Act and the 
INA are used interchangeably. 
7 INA §101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (Westlaw 2009). 
8 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1164; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (2001) 
("[Duress) is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to 
constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, 
unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist."). 
9 Under the INA, immigration judges decide refugee-related matters. Decisions 
can be appealed to the BIA, which is the administrative appellate court in the 
Executive Office of Immigration Review and a part of the Department of Justice. 
Decisions from the BIA are subject to further judicial review by the United States 
Court of Appeals. See Joseph Rikhof, War Criminals Not Welcome; How Common Law 
Countries Approach the Phenomenon of International Crimes in the Immigration and 
Refugee Context, 211NT'L J. REFUGEE L. 453, 494 (2009). 
10 In immigration law, "refugee" refers to a person applying for protection in the 
United States from outside its borders and "asylee" refers to a person applying for 
protection who is already in the United States. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF 
ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., 3d ed. Refugee Law Center 1999). 
11 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1162 (majority opinion). 
12 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Negusie v. Holder, several law 
review articles have addressed the shortcomings of an absolute bar to asylum for those 
who have persecuted others in the past. For a thorough discussion of the decision, see 
David A. Karp, Setting the 'Persecutor Bar" for Political Asylum after Negusie v. 
Holder, 61 FLA. L. REV. 933 (2009). For an in-depth look at the persecutor bar as it 
applies to child soldiers, see Kathryn White, A Chance For Redemption: Revising the 
"Persecutor Bar" and "Material Support Bar" in the Case of Child Soldiers, 43 V AND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 191 (2010). 
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the establishment of the persecutor bar, including the split in 
the courts as to how to interpret it and whether to allow the 
defense of duress. Part II focuses on Justice Scalia's concurring 
opinion in Negusie v. Holder, which summarizes and explains 
the arguments supporting an absolute persecutor bar. Justice 
Scalia posited that duress is not a defense against harming 
others, that asylum is a privilege requiring consideration of an 
individual's "desirability," and that a bright-line rule is needed 
to support the BIA's administrative needs. 13 Finally, Part III 
recommends a case-by-case analysis of the applicability of the 
persecutor bar, one that allows the defense of duress in limited 
circumstances for those seeking asylum who have persecuted 
others against their will. To accomplish this goal, the duress 
defense should be a "totality of the circumstances" test that 
takes into consideration: 1) the degree of assistance that the 
alien gave to the persecution of others, 2) whether the alien 
was acting to avoid a threat of death or serious bodily injury, 3) 
whether the harm inflicted was less than the harm avoided, 
and 4) whether the alien escaped as soon as possible. This 
Comment concludes by recommending that the BIA adopt a 
new approach allowing a defense of duress and proposing that 
Congress amend the INA to specifically include the duress 
defense. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Daniel Negusie worked as a prison guard in Eritrea, where 
prisoners were persecuted on the basis of their religion and 
political opinions. 14 A dual Ethiopian and Eritrean citizen, 
Negusie was beaten and imprisoned, then involuntarily 
enlisted as a prison guard by the Eritrean government after he 
refused to fight against Ethiopia.15 Negusie later testified that, 
while working at the prison, he carried a gun, guarded the gate 
to prevent escape, and kept prisoners from taking showers and 
obtaining fresh air.16 One day Negusie witnessed a man dying 
from extreme sun exposure, but he failed to let the man 
inside. 17 
13 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1169-70 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
14 Id at 1162 (majority opinion). 
16 Id. 
16 Id. at 1162-63. 
17 Id. at 1163. 
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Negusie testified that he would have been executed if he 
had tried to stop working as a prison guard. 18 He knew this 
because two other guards had been killed for attempting to 
escape. 19 Eventually, Negusie escaped from prison, hid on a 
ship bound for the United States, and sought asylum upon his 
arriva1.20 The immigration judge determined that, if Negusie 
were sent back to Eritrea, he would be tortured. 21 Accordingly, 
Negusie was granted a temporary deferral of removal under 
the Convention Against Torture.22 
Although the immigration judge found Negusie's testimony 
to be credible, the judge denied Negusie asylum and instead 
granted him a temporary deferral because Negusie had 
participated in the persecution of others while working as an 
armed guard.23 The BIA and the Fifth Circuit both affirmed 
the immigration judge's decision.24 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard 
Negusie's case during the 2008 term.25 The Court 
acknowledged that the INA's definition of "refugee" is 
ambiguous on the issue of whether coercion or duress should be 
considered in determining if an alien assisted or participated in 
persecution. 26 However, the Court did not issue a 
determination of whether that defense was applicable.27 
Instead, the Court found that the BIA had erroneously relied 
on Matter of Fedorenko, the preeminent case that established 
18 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) (No. 
07-499), 2008 WL 4264484. 
19 Id. 
20 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1163. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 16, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 
(2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2445504. 
The [immigration judge) found that [Negusie) was credible and that there was 
'no evidence to establish that [Negusie) is a malicious person or that he was an 
aggressive person who mistreated the prisoners.' Nevertheless, the 
[immigration judge) determined that 'the very fact that he helped keep [the 
prisoners) in the prison compound where he had reason to know that they were 
persecuted constitutes assisting in the persecution of others and bars [Negusie) 
from relief.' 
2. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1163. 
25 Id. at 1162. 
28 Id. at 1164. 
27 Id. at 1162. 
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an absolute bar to asylum for former Nazis.28 The Court then 
remanded the case to the BIA to determine whether a defense 
of duress was available under the circumstances of Negusie's 
1 1 · 29 asy urn calm. 
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE PERSECUTOR BAR 
To understand the modern application of the persecutor 
bar it is helpful to first briefly trace its history. The persecutor 
bar was originally enacted after World War II as a response to 
congressional concern that Nazi war criminals were entering 
the United States and seeking asylum.30 Former Nazi officials 
were attempting to use the "Nuremberg Defense" by claiming 
that they were simply following orders when they carried out 
Hitler's commands.31 Fearful that refugees would be forced to 
live side-by-side with their Nazi persecutors, Congress passed 
the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.32 The Displaced Persons Act 
automatically barred former Nazis from admission to the 
United States, regardless of any excuses or defenses. 33 
The United States signed the United Nations Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1968.34 The United States 
incorporated the provisions of the Protocol into domestic law 
with the Refugee Act of 1980, which amended INA § 101(a)(42), 
the definition of "refugee," to read in relevant part:35 
The term "refugee" means ... any person ... who is unable 
or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 
28 Id. at 1165; see Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). 
29 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1162. 
30 Lori K. Walls, The Persecutor Bar in U.S. Immigration Law: Toward a More 
Nuanced Understanding of Modern "Persecution" in the Case of Forced Abortion and 
Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 227,229 (2007). 
31 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1165. 
32 Displaced Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), amended 
by Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950), and Pub. L. No. 82-60, 65 Stat. 96 (1951). 
33 Lori K. Walls, The Persecutor Bar in U.S. Immigration Law: Toward a More 
Nuanced Understanding of Modern "Persecution" in the Case of Forced Abortion and 
Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 227, 230 (2007). 
34 Anwen Hughes, Asylum and WithholdingofRemoval-A Brief Overview of the 
Substantive Law, 1659 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE/CORP 305, 307 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
35 Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102; see also Anwen Hughes, Asylum 
and Withholding of Removal-A Brief Overview of the Substantive Law, 1659 
PRACTISING LAw INSTITUTE/CORP 305,307 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
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persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion .... The term "refUgee" does 
not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or 
otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.36 
The U.S. Attorney General is tasked with establishing a 
procedure for the consideration of asylum applications.37 
Accordingly, the Attorney General has the discretion to grant 
or deny asylum, and vests this power in immigration judges.3s 
If an applicant does not qualify as a refugee, asylum is not 
available.39 If, however, an individual does meet the definition 
of a refugee, asylum is still not guaranteed.40 Furthermore, 
should the evidence indicate that the applicant persecuted 
others in the past, the burden is on the applicant to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he or she did not.41 If the 
testimony of the applicant is found credible, it may be sufficient 
to sustain the burden without corroborating evidence.42 
Asylum is not the only option for those fleeing danger to 
seek relief in the United States. Applicants may also 
potentially qualify for "withholding of removal," which is 
available under INA § 241(b)(3) and is a mandatory form of 
relief. 43 However, withholding of removal requires the 
36 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (Westlaw 2009) (emphasis added). 
37 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(d)(1) (WestJaw 2009) ("The Attorney General shall establish 
a procedure for the consideration of asylum applications filed under subsection (a) of 
this section. The Attorney General may require applicants to submit fmgerprints and a 
photograph at such time and in such manner to be determined by regulation by the 
Attorney General."). 
38 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (Paul T. Lufkin 
ed., 3d ed. Refugee Law Center 1999). 
39 U.S. CITIZENSlllP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC 
TRAINING, MANDATORY BARS TO ASYLUM AND DISCRETION, (Mar. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/filesiarticle/AOBTC_Lesson_ %2011_ %20Mandatory _ %20Bars_to_ 
%20Asylum_and_ %20Discretion. pdf. 
40 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 (1987). 
41 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(ii) (Westlaw 2009); see also Derek C. Julias, Splitting 
Hairs: Burden of Proof, Voluntariness and Scienter Under the Persecutor Bar to 
Asylum-Based Relief, IMMIGRATION LAW ADVISOR, Vol. 2, No.3 (2008). 
42 8 C.F.R. § 208. 13(a) (WestJaw 2009). 
'3 Anwen Hughes, Asylum and Withholding of Removal-A Brief Overview of the 
Substantive Law, 1659 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE/CORP 305, 307 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
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applicant to meet a higher standard of proof.44 Moreover, even 
if the withholding is granted, the individual receives fewer 
benefits than those who are granted asylum.45 In order to be 
granted withholding of removal the applicant must still meet 
the definition of refugee; thus an applicant is barred from entry 
if he has persecuted others in the past.46 
The persecutor bar does not automatically disqualify an 
individual from receiving a temporary deferral under the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT).47 To qualify for protection 
under CAT, the applicant must be able to show that the harm 
he or she would receive if returned to his or her country of 
origin meets the definition of torture 48 and is more likely than 
not to occur. 49 
However, deferral of removal under CAT "[d]oes not confer 
upon the alien any lawful or permanent immigration status in 
the United States."50 Without any legal right to remain in the 
44 Anwen Hughes, Asylum and Withholding of Remova~A Brief Overview of the 
Substantive Law, 1659 PRACTISING LAw lNSTITUTFJCORP 305, 307 (Mar. 20, 2008) 
(citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-
30 (1984»: 
The grounds for withholding of removal are thus the same five protected grounds 
given in the refugee definition at INA § 101(a)(42), but the applicant must 
[slhow a higher probability of persecution. Instead of establishing a reasonable 
possibility of persecution (the well-founded fear standard for asylum), in order to 
qualify for withholding of removal an applicant must show a clear probability of 
persecution, or that persecution would be more likely than not. 
45 Anwen Hughes, Asylum and Withholding ofRemova~A Brief Overview of the 
Substantive Law, 1659 PRACTISING LAW lNSTITUTFJCORP 305, 307 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
46 Id.; see also Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1162 (2009). 
47 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1162; 8 CFR § 1208.17(a) (Westlaw 2009). 
48 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (Westlaw 2009): 
Torture is defmed as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or 
her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
In addition, "CAT limits its defmition oftorture to acts 'inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.'" Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1174 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
49 Anwen Hughes, Asylum and Withholding of Remova~A Brief Overview of the 
Substantive Law, 1659 PRACTISING LAW lNSTITUTFJCORP 305, 332 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
50 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(b)(1)(i) (Westlaw 2009). 
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United States, an alien may be detained at any time by the 
Department of Homeland Security and removed to another 
country where he or she is not likely to be tortured. 51 So, while 
withholdings and temporary deferrals offer other avenues for 
those escaping from dangerous situations, asylum remains the 
most secure. 
B. FEDORENKO V. UNITED STATES. THE DECISION THAT 
ESTABLISHED AN ABSOLUTE PERSECUTOR BAR AND SET THE 
STAGE FOR NEGUSIE 
Since 1988, the BIA has relied on the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Fedorenko v. United States, which established that 
the persecutor bar as applied to Nazis does not include an 
exception for acts that were involuntary or otherwise the 
product of duress. 52 Feodor Fedorenko served as an armed 
guard at Treblinka, a Nazi concentration camp in Poland. 53 He 
came to the United States in 1949, applied for a visa under the 
Displaced Persons Act, and became a U.S. citizen in 1970.54 In 
his application, Fedorenko misrepresented his involvement in 
WWII, including the fact that while serving for the Russian 
Army, he was captured by the Germans and conscripted into 
the German forces. 55 
When it came to the government's attention that 
Fedorenko had omitted this fact on his application, a 
denaturalization action was brought against him.56 Fedorenko 
admitted that he gave false information on his application, but 
claimed that he had been forced to work as an armed guard 
against his wil1. 57 But the U.S. Supreme Court rejected his 
duress defense, holding that service as an armed guard in a 
concentration camp, although involuntary, automatically made 
51 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(b)(2)(c) (Westlaw 2009). 
52 While the BIA's reliance on Fedorenko has ended with Negusie, an 
understanding of Fedorenko is necessary to any potential duress exception to the 
persecutor bar, since it was the controlling case on the matter for nearly thirty years. 
See Brigette Frantz, Assistance in Persecution Under Duress: The Supreme Court's 
Decision in Negusie v. Holder and the Misplaced Reliance on Fedorenko v. United 
States, IMMIGRATION LAw ADVISOR Vol. 3, No.5 (2009). 




57 Id. at 490-91. 
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him ineligible for a visa. 58 
In Negusie v. Holder, the Supreme Court held that 
Fedorenko applied only to applicants under the Displaced 
Persons Act, which was established to bar asylum for those 
who participated in WWII persecution. 59 While the Displaced 
Persons Act was enacted to deal with specific atrocities, the 
Refugee Act, later incorporated into the INA, was enacted for 
more generalized purposes. so Of notable difference, the 
Displaced Persons Act specifically excluded two groups from 
the definition of displaced persons: those who "assisted the 
enemy in persecuting civil populations" and those who 
"voluntarily assisted the enemy forces."sl 
In Fedorenko, the Court found that the deliberate omission 
of the word ''voluntary'' from the first criterion, and its 
inclusion in the second criterion, "compels the conclusion that 
the statute made all those who assisted in the persecution of 
civilians ineligible for visas."s2 The INA, on the other hand, 
contains no "voluntary" language at all.s3 Therefore, the Court 
in Negusie v. Holder found that the decision in Fedorenko did 
not control the BIA's interpretation of the INA's persecutor 
bar.s4 
Instead of issuing a final decision, the Supreme Court 
remanded Negusie's case back to the BIA with instructions 
that the BIA reinterpret the statute.S5 The Court held that it is 
the BIA's responsibility to interpret the INA in the first 
instance, and it must do so without any misplaced reliance on 
58 Id. at 491-92 ("The plain language of the definition of 'displaced persons' for 
purposes of the DPA as excluding individuals who 'assisted the enemy in persecuting 
civilliansl' mandates the literal interpretation, rejected by the District Court, that an 
individual's service as a concentration camp armed guard- whether voluntary or 
involuntary- made him ineligible for a visa."). 
59 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1165 (2009). 
60 Id. at 1165. The Displaced Persons Act (DPA) was enacted as a result of 
World War II. Dealing specifically with the horrors of the Holocaust, the Court in 
Fedorenko decided that past acts of persecution, whether voluntary or not, were proper 
grounds for denial of asylum. The Refugee Act, on the other hand, was not enacted to 
deal with any specific atrocity but to instead "to provide a general rule for the ongoing 
treatment of all refugees and displaced persons." Id. 
61 Displaced Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 80-774; 62 Stat. 1009 (June 25, 1948) 
(emphasis added). 
62 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512. 
63 See U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (Westlaw 2009). 
64 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1166. 
65 Id. at 1167. 
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Fedorenko.66 The Court did, however, leave open the possibility 
that it would subsequently review the BIA's decision, stating 
that the BIA must come to a "reasonable" interpretation.67 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia took issue with 
the majority, stating, "I would not agree to remand if I did not 
think that the agency has the option of adhering to its 
decision."68 Justice Scalia opined that the BIA's current 
practice of refusing to grant exceptions for involuntary acts is 
reasonable in light of the ambiguous statute with which it is 
dealing.69 While he did not endorse any particular rule, he 
commented that the BIA must only decide the case before it 
and, in his view, did not need to provide an "all-embracing 
answer.'010 Furthermore, Justice Scalia stated that the 
argument that ''barring aliens who persecuted under duress 
would punish purely 'nonculpable' conduct" suffers from three 
unjustified leaps of 10gic. 71 First, duress is no defense; second, 
asylum should be granted only to those who are desirable; and 
third, a bright-line rule is needed in order for the BIA to be 
effective. 72 
While the majority in Negusie v. Holder, in an opinion 
written by Justice Kennedy, alluded to a "reasonable" 
interpretation, it gave no direction to the BIA as to whether 
that interpretation may include a defense of duress. 73 Justice 
Scalia's concurrence is important to examine because he 
actually provided clear suggestions for the BIA to follow. 74 
Justice Scalia explicitly defended the BIA's current application 
of the persecutor bar and offered rationalizations for why an 
absolute bar is reasonable.75 While he concurred because he 
agreed that the BIA has the authority to interpret the INA free 
from the former constraints of Fedorenko, he did not believe 
that the BIA was foreclosed from applying the persecutor bar to 
N egusie, so long as the choice to do so is soundly reasoned and 
66 I d. 
67 I d. at 1168 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
68 Id. 
69 Id 
70 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
71 Id. at 1169. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1163-68 (majority opinion). 
74 Id. at 1168-70 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
75 Id. 
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not based on irrelevant or arbitrary factors like the Fedorenko 
decision. 76 Although Justice Scalia's arguments have the 
benefit of being straightforward, he fundamentally failed to 
consider the context in which modern persecution takes place 
and the historical underpinnings of asylum law in the United 
States. 
C. THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS' STRUGGLE To DEFINE 
"PERSECUTION" AND THE DISAGREEMENT OVER WHETHER A 
DEFENSE OF DURESS Is AVAILABLE TO PAST PERSECUTORS 
Although those who have persecuted others in the past are 
excluded from refugee status under INA § 101(a)(42), the 
statute does not define what acts constitute persecution. 77 As 
one commentator noted, "[t]here is no universally accepted 
definition of 'persecution,' and various attempts to formulate 
such a definition have met with little success.,,7S For example, 
in the Ninth Circuit, persecution is defined as "the infliction of 
suffering or harm upon those who differ ... in a way regarded 
as offensive.,,79 There is an exception for persecutory acts that 
are directly related to civil war.so However, "[w]here conduct is 
active and has direct consequences for the victim, such conduct 
is considered assistance."sl Mere membership in an 
organization that persecutes is an insufficient reason to 
automatically deny asylum, but actual "trigger-pulling" is not 
required to bar relief. S2 Likewise, in the Second Circuit, if "the 
conduct was tangential to the acts of oppression and passive in 
nature" then it was not found to be persecution.s3 These 
ambiguous definitions leave much to the imagination. With 
76 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
778 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (Westlaw 2009). 
78 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAw OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 171 (Paul T. 
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. Refugee Law Center 1999) (quoting United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status § 51 (1988». 
79 Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996). 
80 Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 930-32 (9th Cir. 2006). However, 
this exception is not absolute: "on the battlefield conflict" is not persecution, whereas 
"torture" is. 
81 Anna Marie Gallagher, Aliens IneligibJe for AsyJum, 2 IMMIGR. L. SERVICE, 2d 
§ 10:180 (2009). 
82 Miranda Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 927. 
83 Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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this lack of guidance, identification of who is subject to the 
persecutor bar has proven extremely difficult.84 
In addition to the lack of a clear and consistent definition 
of the term "persecution," confusion has also arisen regarding 
the availability of an exception to the persecutor bar if the 
persecution was coerced or otherwise involuntary. The BIA 
has long held that voluntariness and duress are not pertinent 
to the persecutor analysis because "an alien's motivation and 
intent are irrelevant to the issue of whether he 'assisted' in 
persecution . . . and . . . it is the objective effect of an alien's 
actions which is controlling."85 While this may be the standard 
that the BIA promotes, the courts have the responsibility of 
deciding whether the BIA's standard represents a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute. Notwithstanding the BIA's 
approach, various courts of appeals have established conflicting 
interpretations of whether a duress defense applies.86 
For example, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits require some 
evidence of personal culpability before determining that an 
individual has persecuted another.87 In order to establish 
84 See Sophie Feal, Still Hazy After All These Years: Persecution and tIle 
"Persecutor Bar" Standard, 14 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 455,463 (Apr. 15, 2009). 
85 In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 69 (B.I.A. 1985); see Thomas K. Ragland, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Supreme Court Stn"kes Down Long-Standing BIA 
Interpretation of "Persecutor Bar" (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/litigationicommitteeslimmigrationiarticlesl0309_ragland.html. 
86 Sophie Feal, Still Hazy After All These Years: Persecution and the "Persecutor 
Bar" Standard, 14 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 455, 464 (Apr. 15, 2009). In part, this is 
because appeals can be brought only before the court of appeals for the circuit in which 
the immigration proceedings were completed. 8 V.S.C.A. § 1252(b)(2) (Westlaw 2010). 
This has resulted in conflicting interpretations of the persecutor bar within the BIA 
itself and among the courts of appeals. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAw OF ASYLUM IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., 3d ed. Refugee Law Center 1999). 
87 See Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 815 (8th Cir. 2001): 
There is no evidence that Hernandez's participation with ORPA was not at all 
times compelled by fear of death, to indicate that Hernandez shared any 
persecutory motives, or to show that he did not escape as soon as possible. The 
Board should have examined all aspects of Hernandez's testimony when 
determining whether his conduct constituted assistance in persecution. 
See also Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2006): 
Miranda's services as an interpreter amounted to assistance in persecution. 
His acts were material to the interrogations and their accompanying torture, 
and his assistance was personally culpable-that is, engaged in for reasons 
other than direct self-defense and unaccompanied by meaningful attempts at 
noncompliance or escape. Together, these elements establish that Miranda is 
covered by the persecutor exception. 
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personal culpability, they look to the applicant's "personal 
involvement" and "purposeful assistance," essentially factoring 
the voluntariness of the acts into the totality of the 
circumstances.88 Likewise, the Second Circuit requires scienter 
before it will apply the persecutor bar.89 To be culpable, the 
alien must have had "sufficient knowledge" that his or her 
actions might assist in persecution. 90 
Conversely, individual accountability is not a requirement 
for establishing culpability in other circuits. In the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits, a person's motivation is irrelevant if he or 
she has persecuted another.91 In these circuits, if an allegation 
of persecution is found reliable, asylum is automatically denied 
without any inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the 
persecution or the petitioner's state of mind. 92 These circuits 
most closely follow the decision in Fedorenko; once persecution 
is established, no additional factors are considered. 
Ultimately, the lack of a unified approach is problematic 
because it provides no clear guidance to asylum applicants. 
Moreover, under the existing system, an applicant's chances of 
securing asylum are in large part determined by where he or 
she goes to court.93 Two asylum applicants with similar stories 
should not face the prospect of such entirely different results. 
Furthermore, this inconsistency between jurisdictions could 
inevitably lead to circuit-based forum shopping. 
Following the decision in Negusie v. Holder, the BIA can 
88 Joseph Rikhof, War Criminals Not Welcome: How Common Law Countries 
Approach the Phenomenon of International Crimes in the Immigration and Refugee 
Context, 211NT'L J. REFUGEE L. 453, 500-01 (2009). 
89 Yan Yan Lin v. Holder, 584 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 2009). 
90 Id. 
91 See Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Bah participated in 
persecution, and the persecution occurred because of an individual's political opinions. 
Had Congress wanted to base the withholding of removal on the alien's intent, it could 
have enacted a statute that withheld removal only of an 'alien who, because of an 
individual's political opinion, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the 
persecution.'"); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Just 
because Singh supposedly did not share in the persecutory motive and his 
assistance/participation was premised upon pecuniary concerns does not change his 
fate under § 1l01(a)(42)."). 
92 Joseph Rikhof, War Criminals Not Welcome: How Common Law Countries 
Approach the Phenomenon of International Crimes in the Immigration and Refugee 
Context, 21 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 453, 500 (2009). 
93 Leah Durland, Overcoming the Persecutor Bar: Applying B Purposeful Mens 
Rea Requirement to 8 u.s.c. § llOl(A)(42), 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 571, 597 (Spring 
2009). 
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no longer rely on Fedorenko as precedent requiring an absolute 
bar to asylum for past persecutors.94 Instead, the BIA will soon 
be setting a new standard for granting asylum. Whether it will 
contain an exception for persecution that occurred while the 
applicant was under duress remains uncertain. 95 It is also 
unclear what degree of impact the BIA's decision will have on 
current asylum applications since the courts of appeals have 
already established their individual criteria for applying the 
persecutor bar.96 Although the courts must defer to an agency's 
permissible interpretation of a statute the agency is charged 
with administering,97 this deference has not resulted in 
uniformity across the circuits. For example, the BIA was 
attempting to enforce an absolute persecutor bar through its 
reliance on Fedorenko, yet the circuit courts still exercised 
extremely different applications of the rule. 
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AN ABSOLUTE PERSECUTOR BAR 
Until Negusie, the BIA relied uncritically on Fedorenko to 
set the standard of an absolute bar to asylum for those who 
have persecuted others in the past.98 Due to this misplaced 
reliance, the BIA has never exercised its authority to actually 
interpret the statute, an interpretation that would be entitled 
to significant judicial deference.99 In Chevron UB.A. Inc. v. 
94 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1167 (2009). However, the Court made 
clear that the BIA may still ultimately decide to retain an absolute bar for those who 
have assisted or participated in the persecution of others. 
95 Sophie Feal, Still Hazy After All These Years: Persecution and the "Persecutor 
Bar" Standard, 14 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 455, 467 (Apr. 15, 2009). 
96 Brigette Frantz, Assistance in Persecution Under Duress: The Supreme 
Court's Decision in Negusie v. Holder and the Misplaced Reliance on Fedorenko v. 
United States, IMMIGRATION LAw ADVISOR Vol. 3, No.5 (2009) ("What is fairly certain 
is that this issue is long from resolved and will continue to perplex courts for years to 
come."). 
97 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
98 Thomas K. Ragland, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, Supreme Court Strikes 
Down Long-Standing BIA Interpretation of "Persecutor Bar" (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committeeslimmigration/articlesl0309Jagland.html. 
99 In Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court 
announced a two-part test for reviewing an "agency's construction of the statute which 
it administers." First, the court must look to "whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue." If there is clear legislative intent, then the court and the 
agency must follow it. However, if the intent of Congress is ambiguous, the court 
cannot impose its own construction, it must instead determine whether the 
14
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Natural Resources Defense Councl1, Inc., the Supreme Court 
recognized the broad authority of a federal administrative 
agency to determine the meaning of ambiguous statutes the 
agency is charged with administering. loo Because it is unclear 
whether the INA allows a duress defense, and the BIA has to 
date erroneously relied on Fedorenko to mandate a denial of 
asylum, the BIA has not yet exercised this powerful 
interpretive authority. 101 Through the Supreme Court's 
remand in Negusie, the BIA will fmally have the opportunity to 
do so. 
Although the BIA can no longer uncritically rely on 
Fedorenko, there is nothing preventing the agency from 
applying the same standard and concluding that past 
persecution remains an absolute bar to asylum.102 With this 
consideration in mind, it is imperative to dissect Justice 
Scalia's justifications for an absolute bar and to consider the 
policy implications of his reasoning. Instead of Justice Scalia's 
blanket application, a careful analysis leads to the conclusion 
that a more nuanced approach to the persecutor bar, taking 
into consideration an individual's culpability and equitable 
defenses, is necessary, given the modern contexts in which 
persecution takes place. 
Keeping in mind that it is within the legislative purview to 
alter statutes, Congress should amend INA §101(a)(42) to 
include a defense of duress for those who have been forced to 
persecute others in the past. While the BIA should redefine its 
interpretation of the persecutor bar to allow for a duress 
defense, legislative action is also necessary. A more unified 
definition and application, by way of an amendment to the 
statute, is needed in order to remedy the confusion among 
administering agency's interpretation was permissible. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984). "An initial agency interpretation 
is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed 
rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a 
continuing basis." [d. at 863-64. 
100 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the 
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a 
specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given 
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute. "). 
101 Thomas K. Ragland, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, Supreme Court Strikes 
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circuits. 
A. DURESS AS A DEFENSE TO PAST PERSECUTION 
1. Culpability Implies Voluntariness 
An individual's culpability when he or she has harmed 
another while under duress raises "profound questions of moral 
philosophy and individual responsibility."l03 The rationale 
behind the defense of duress in the criminal-law context is that 
a defendant should be excused from blameworthiness if he or 
she "is the victim of a threat that a person of reasonable moral 
strength could not fairly be expected to resist."l04 For duress to 
constitute a defense to a criminal charge, the threat must be 
"present, imminent, and impending, and of such a nature as to 
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily 
injury if the act is not done.,,105 However, duress is not a 
defense to taking an innocent life. lOS 
In his concurring opinion in Negusie, Justice Scalia 
pointed out that, at common law, duress was no defense to an 
intentional killing. l07 Likewise, when a soldier follows a 
military order that he or she knows is unlawful, duress is no 
defense. lOB Also, "in modern times some states do not allow 
[duress] as a defense to lesser crimes.,,109 Based on these 
principles, Justice Scalia opined that it is far from clear that 
excluding a defense of duress to the persecutor bar would 
ignore "universal and persistent" principles of blame in 
American law.110 
Justice Scalia took several liberties with this argument. 
First, he down played the role that duress plays in modern 
103 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1169 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
104 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 9.7(b) (2d ed. 2009) (quoting 
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis on the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching 
tiJr Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1367 (1989). 
105 L.I. Reiser, Coercion, Compulsion, or Duress as Defense to Criminal 
Prosecution, 40 A.L.R.2d 908 § 2 (1955). 
106 Id. at § 2.2. 
107 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 9.7(b), at 74-75 (2d ed. 2003». 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
llO Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 32 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246, 250 (1952))). 
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contexts. Today, a number of jurisdictions do recognize duress 
as a defense to crimes lesser than murder if: 1) another person 
threatened to kill or grievously injure the actor or a third party 
unless the actor committed the offense, 2) the actor reasonably 
believed the threat was genuine, 3) the threat was imminent, 
4) there was no reasonable escape, and 5) the actor was not at 
fault for exposing himself or herself to the threat.lll In 
addition, the Model Penal Code categorizes duress as a defense 
of general applicability, meaning it can be raised even in 
murder prosecutions. 112 Modernly, about half of the states do 
allow duress as a limited defense to murder, typically to 
mitigate it from first-degree murder to manslaughter.113 The 
Model Penal Code also allows the defense of duress to be raised 
even if it is not in response to an "imminent deadly threat.,,114 
To date, duress has been recognized as a complete defense to 
treason, robbery, burglary, malicious mischief, kidnapping, 
arson, weapon possession, and prison escape.115 Justice Scalia's 
discussion of the historical availability of the duress defense at 
common law ignored these clear current trends. 
Moreover, Justice Scalia emphasized that duress is often 
no defense to intentional killing, but the persecutor bar goes 
further and stops a person from acquiring asylum if he or she 
has participated or assisted in persecution. 116 Intentional 
killing of an innocent person is not at issue here, and there are 
few who would argue that an intentional killer should be 
granted asylum. However, "assisting" in persecution by simply 
being forced to serve as a guard, as was Daniel Negusie, in a 
prison that routinely persecuted others is a far cry from 
intentionally taking another person's life. 
Furthermore, in modem contexts the line between 
persecutor and persecuted has grown hazy. 117 With the 
increase in civil strife and continued exploitation of child 
2006). 
III JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 323-24 (4th ed. LexisNexis 
112 Id. at 341. 
113 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 9.7(b) (2d ed. 2009). 
114 DRESSLER, supra note 111 at 341. 
115 LAFAVE, supra note 113 at § 9.7(b). 
116 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (Westlaw 2009). 
117 Sophie Feal, Still Hazy After All These Years: Persecution and the "Persecutor 
Bar" Standard, 14 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 455, 467 (Apr. 15, 2009). 
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soldiers, liB it makes little sense to have such different asylum 
standards for persecutor and persecuted. In his opening brief, 
Negusie pointed out that automatically barring those who have 
persecuted under duress is "akin to labeling the victim of a 
crime as an aider and abettor of that crime.,,119 Some argue 
that this discrepancy is warranted because it denies asylum to 
applicants who persecuted others under the guise of "following 
orders.,,120 While this is true, it is dramatically over-inclusive. 
A person who stands guard at a prison, inflicting minimal pain 
on others in order to avoid death, should not be denied asylum 
so readily. The outcome in Daniel Negusie's asylum claim 
exemplifies the over-inclusiveness of the persecutor bar. 
In his separate opinion in Negusie, Justice Stevens pointed 
out that, if there is no exception for involuntary action, the INA 
would "treat entire classes of victims as persecutors.,,121 He 
remarked that, based on a natural reading of the statute, its 
context, and its legislative history, the persecutor bar should be 
interpreted to denote only culpable conduct.122 This 
interpretation is more satisfying than Justice Scalia's, because 
it looks at the underlying circumstances that led to the creation 
of the persecutor bar and acknowledges that culpability was a 
major component in barring people from refugee status.123 
liB UNITED NATIONS GENERAL AsSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT, 11 
U.N. A161J275 (Aug. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.un.org!galsearCh!VieW_doc.aSP?Symbol=A161J275&Lang=E· 
119Briefforpetitionerat20.Negusiev.Holder.129s.Ct.1159 (2009) (No. 07-
499), 2008 WL 2445504. 
120 Nicole Lerescu, Barring Too Much: An Argument in Favor of Interpreting the 
Immigration and Nationality Act Section lOl(A)(42) to Include a Duress Exception, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1894-96 (2007). This article was written before the Supreme 
Court decided Negusie v. Holder, when the BIA was still relying on Matter of 
Fedorenko to absolutely bar persecutors. The author states, "The problem is that just 
as much culpability often lies with those who participate in wrongful acts, even when 
they do not share the motive that makes those acts wrong." Id. at 1896. The author 
goes on to propose that courts should allow a defense of duress for those who have 
persecuted in the past. Id. at 1900-03. While this would be a start, it does not go far 
enough. Because of the varying interpretations among the circuits, a legislative 
approach by way of amending the persecutor bar to include a defense of duress would 
ensure a more standard application. 
121 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1174 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. ("The language of the persecutor bar is most naturally read to denote 
culpable conduct, and this reading is powerfully supported by the statutory context and 
legislative history."). 
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Noting that the Refugee Act was passed to implement the 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Convention), Justice Stevens pointed out that the Convention 
mandated that refugees persecuted on a protected ground not 
be expelled or returned to the country where the persecution 
occurred. 124 The Convention made an exception for persons who 
have "committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity. "125 The persecutor bar of the Refugee Act 
was enacted to reflect this exception. 126 As Justice Stevens 
remarked, this language is critical to our interpretation 
because "[w]e do not normally convict individuals of crimes 
when their actions are coerced or otherwise involuntary.,,127 
Justice Scalia opined that excluding a duress defense for 
asylum applicants is rational because asylum is a civil and not 
a criminal matter. 128 Under this view, culpability is arguably 
irrelevant because an "'order of deportation is not a 
punishment for crime.'" 129 An asylum applicant, however, 
would probably beg to differ. Deporting an applicant to a 
country where he or she may face persecution is tantamount to 
punishing him or her for a past crime. Unless the applicant is 
truly culpable, this is too harsh a result. 
Furthermore, the defense of duress is not strictly limited to 
criminal law, but has been extended to areas of civil law as 
well. For example, a duress defense is well-established in 
contract law.lao In addition, duress has been recognized in 
immigration law as a defense to liability under 8 U.S.C. § 1323, 
which prohibits unlawfully bringing aliens into the United 
124 Id. at 1174-75 (Stevens J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United 
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, [1968] 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 6263 T.I.A.S. No. 6577. 
125 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1174-75; United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, [1968]19 U.S.T. 6223, 6263 T.I.A.S. No. 6577. 
126 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1175 (Stevens J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
127 Id 
128 Id. at 1169 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
129 Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893». 
130 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1981) ("If conduct that 
appears to be a manifestation of assent by a party who does not intend to engage in 
that conduct is physically compelled by duress, the conduct is not effective as a 
manifestation of assent."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(d) 
(1981) ("Duress by threat results in a contract voidable by the victim. It differs in this 
important respect from duress by physical compulsion, which results in there being no 
contract at all."). 
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States.I31 If the United States recognizes duress as a defense in 
criminal law and limited areas of civil law, that defense should 
also be available in asylum law. 
2. A Duress Defense Is Consistent with International 
Standards 
United States asylum law is rooted in international law. 132 
A system of granting asylum that includes a defense of duress 
in limited circumstances would bring the United States more in 
line with international standards.133 At present, 147 countries 
have adopted the United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees,134 and other parties to the Convention read 
the persecutor bar as limited to purely culpable conduct. 135 The 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
requires a person claiming a defense of duress to prove not only 
that he or she was avoiding a threat of imminent death or 
serious bodily injury to himself or herself or to another, but 
also that his or her actions were reasonable and proportionate 
to the threat avoided. 136 
131 Lyden v. Howerton, 783 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1986) ("It is now the settled 
law of this circuit that duress is available as a defense to violations of 8 U.S.C. § 
1323."). 
132 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Paul T. Lufkin 
ed., 3d ed. Refugee Law Center 1999). 
133 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1175 (Stevens J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ("When we interpret treaties, we consider the interpretations of the courts of 
other nations, and we should do the same when Congress asks us to interpret a statute 
in light of a treaty's language. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 
226-228, 116 S. Ct. 629, 133 L.Ed.2d 596 (1996). Congress' effort to conform United 
States law to the standard set forth in the U.N. Convention and Protocol shows that it 
intended the persecutor bar to apply only to culpable, voluntary act&-and it 
underscores that Congress did not delegate the question presented by this case to the 
agency."). 
134 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 




135 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1175 (Stevens J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing Canada v. Asghedom, [2001] F.C.T. 972, 28 (Can. Fed. Ct.); Gurung v. 
Secretary of State for Home Dept., [2002] UKIAT 4870, 108-110 (U.K. Immigr. App. 
Trib.); SRYYY v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, 
[2005] 147 F.C.R. 1, 126-128 (Austl. Fed. Ct.); Refugee Appeal No. 2142194, at 12-14 
(N.Z. Refugee Status App. Auth., Mar. 20, 1997». 
136 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NO.5: APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSION 
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In Canada, the defense of duress is available to a past 
persecutor seeking asylum "if there is an imminent, real and 
inevitable threat, and if the risk of harm to the perpetrator is 
disproportionate to the harm inflicted on the victim.,,137 
Similarly, duress is a defense in New Zealand so long as it is 
marked by an absence of intent to persecute.13S To meet this 
requirement the claimant must show: 1) that the act was done 
to avoid imminent and grave peril, 2) that the act was 
reasonable, 3) that the situation deprived the claimant of the 
ability to choose, and 4) that the harm caused was 
proportionate to the harm avoided. 139 In the United Kingdom 
and Australia, duress is also a defense to assisting or 
participating in persecution, so long as the harm avoided was 
greater than the harm inflicted. 140 Thus, incorporating a 
defense of duress into the persecutor bar would not only be 
consistent with U.S. domestic law, it would also best reflect 
accepted international standards. 
B. DESIRABILITY IS NOT A VALID PREREQUISITE FOR ASYLUM 
In his next argument rationalizing an absolute bar, Justice 
Scalia commented that "'culpability' as a relevant factor in 
determining admissibility is only one facet of a more general 
consideration: desirability.,,14l The rationale behind the 
persecutor bar is that certain acts are so grave as to render the 
actors undeserving of international protection as refugees. 142 
The "primary purpose is to deprive those guilty of heinous acts, 
and serious common crimes, of international refugee protection 
and to ensure that such persons do not abuse the institution of 
CLAUSES: ARTICLE IF OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES 7 (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
binltexis/vtxlsearch ?page=search&docid=3f7 d48514&query=exclusion %20clauses. 
137 Joseph Rikhof, War Criminals Not Welcome: How Common Law Countries 
Approach the Phenomenon of International Crimes in the Immigration and Refugee 
Context, 21 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 453, 466 (2009). 
138 Id. at 483. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 506-07. 
141 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1169 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
142 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NO.5: APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSION 
CLAUSES: ARTICLE IF OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES (HCRIGIP/03/05) (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
binltexislvtxlsearch ?page=search&docid=3f7 d48514&query=exclusion %20clauses. 
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asylum in order to avoid being held legally accountable for 
their acts.,,143 Thus, a person may be denied asylum ifhe or she 
has "engaged in conduct that makes [him or her] 'unworthy' of 
t · ,,144 protec IOn. 
Advocates of an absolute persecutor bar contend that, if 
asylum is granted to a person on the grounds that he or she 
has been persecuted in his or her home country, it would be 
thoughtless to provide asylum at the same time to the person 
who carried out the persecution.145 Justice Scalia commented 
that an absolute bar to asylum for those who have persecuted 
others in the past, even those acting under duress, might be 
reasonable if it keeps out immigrants that are "undesirable.,,146 
Along these lines, some suggest that an alien who petitions for 
admission to the United States is seeking a special privilege.147 
Justice Scalia asserts that, "[a]sylum is a benefit accorded by 
grace, not by entitlement, and withholding that benefit from all 
who have intentionally harmed others - whether under 
coercion or not - is not unreasonable.,,148 Aside from the 
difficulty of determining precisely who would be considered 
"undesirable," these arguments contradict the very foundation 
of asylum law by qualifying an applicant on the basis of his or 
her resume alone, without considering need or sufi'ering.149 
When determining whether to grant asylum to certain 
applicants, countries typically follow one of two prominent 
theories: the humanitarian or the political conceptions of 
asylum.150 The humanitarian theory suggests that anyone is 
entitled to asylum if he or she needs protection from serious 
harm, regardless of the source of the harm.151 The need for 
protection creates a moral obligation for those who are able to 
143 Id. 
144 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAw OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 415 (Paul T. 
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. Refugee Law Center 1999). 
145 Lori K. Walls, The Persecutor Bar in u.s. Immigration Law: Toward a More 
Nuanced Understanding of Modern "Persecution" in the Case of Forced Abortion and 
Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 227, 230 (2007). 
146 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia J., concurring). 
147 Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1984). 
148 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
149 See ANKER, supra note 144 at 14-15. 
150 Matthew E. Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law's Preference 
for Persecuted People, 47 HARv. lNT'L L.J. 413,418 (Summer 2006). 
151 Id. at 421. 
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help.I52 In contrast, countries that follow the political theory 
believe that asylum should be reserved for those who were 
persecuted by their home country's government. I53 In this 
model, asylum is seen as a political tool and should be granted 
more readily to people from nations the destination country 
condemns for human-rights abuses. I54 The argument that 
asylum should be granted on the basis of an individual's 
desirability follows the political, as opposed to humanitarian, 
theory. However, the humanitarian theory better complies 
with the philosophical underpinning of asylum-law tenets. 
Asylum law is not in place to reward the most attractive and 
deserving applicants; there are other avenues for talented and 
exceptional people to gain entry to the United States.I55 
Rather, asylum law exists in the United States because we 
have decided as a society that, in some situations, persecution 
and suffering are so severe in an applicant's country of origin 
that the applicant should no longer be subjected to it.I56 
When someone assists in persecution under the threat of 
death to himself or herself, or to family members, it is difficult 
to consider him or her guilty in the traditional criminal sense, 
especially if the harm inflicted by the persecution was of a 
lesser degree than the harm avoided. For example, if a person 
beats a prisoner to avoid his or her own death (or perhaps the 
death of his or her innocent child), it is unreasonable to bar 
that person from asylum based on his or her history of 
persecution. To do so would suggest that we would prefer that 
people lie down and die before they inflict any amount of harm 
on others and would hold asylum applicants - those 
desperately in need of help - to a higher standard than that to 
which we hold our own citizens. 
Internationally, asylum is not always an open-door policy. 
There are countries that do consider a refugee's desirability as 
a factor in the asylum determination. For example, in 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 418. 
154 Id. 
155 Traditional avenues for gaining legal entry to the United States include a U.S. 
Visa, Green Card, or U.S. Citizenship. See http://www.usimmigrationsupport.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 20,2010). 
156 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 14·15 (Paul T. 
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. Refugee Law Center 1999). 
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Australia asylum applicants must pass a character test. 157 An 
applicant will fail the character test if 
[1] they have, or have had, an association with an individual, 
group or organisation suspected of having been, or being, 
involved in criminal conduct [2] having regard to the person's 
past and present criminal conduct, the person is found not to 
be of good character, [or 3] having regard to the person's past 
and present general conduct, the person is found to be not of 
d h 158 goo c aracter. 
However, while Australia considers an asylum applicant's 
desirability, it still allows a defense of duress for those who 
involuntarily assisted or participated in persecution. 159 
Some commentators focus on the fact that immigration 
resources are severely stretched to argue that asylum should 
be granted only to the most remarkable and deserving of 
applicants. 160 Given the current economic crisis, it may seem 
reckless to open our borders to more people. 161 But this 
argument, while it contains some fiscal logic, ignores the 
fundamental basis of asylum law.162 Asylum law is not a 
convenience; it is not something to be adhered to only when 
times are good and the economy is strong. Regardless of U.S. 
economic woes, asylum seekers are fleeing far worse situations. 
In 2008, there were an estimated 16 million refugees and 
asylum seekers worldwide. 163 Perhaps ironically, countries that 
take in the most refugees are often those in the worst financial 
157 Joseph Rikhof, War Criminals Not Welcome: How Common Law Countries 
Approach the Phenomenon of International Crimes in the Immigration and RefUgee 
Context, 21 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 453, 467 (2009) (citing Section 501(6) in conjunction 
with section 5(c) of the Migration Act 1958); see also AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, 
DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSIDP, Fact Sheet 79 - The Character 
Requirement, available athttp://www.immi.gov.auimedialfact-sheets/79character.htm. 
158 Rikhof, supra note 157 at 468. 
159 Id. at 506-07. 





162 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 14-15 (Paul T. 
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. Refugee Law Center 1999). 
163 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Refugee 
Chief Cites Pressing Needs as Those Uprooted Tops 42 Million, June 16, 2009, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4a37c9076.html.. 
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situations themselves. For example, Pakistan takes in the 
most refugees worldwide, followed by the Syrian Arab Republic 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran. I64 When the number of 
refugees is analyzed in comparison to economic capacity, 
Pakistan still takes in the most, followed by the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania. I65 
Despite the fact that most refugees flee to neighboring states/66 
it is still staggering to consider that these countries are taking 
in so many asylum seekers with so few financial resources. I67 
C. A BRIGHT-LINE RULE Is NOT FEASIBLE 
The final point Justice Scalia made in defense of an 
absolute bar for persecutors is the expediency of a bright-line 
rule for immigration judges to follow. I68 Justice Scalia argued 
that, because adjudicating claims of coercion or duress would 
be difficult to corroborate, it would be easier for immigration 
judges to apply an absolute bar. I69 But this argument contains 
a fatal flaw. At its core, the very purpose of immigration 
hearings is to conduct case-by-case determinations of 
eligibility. 170 
The understanding of persecutor and persecuted was 
originally modeled on the Nazis and Holocaust victims.l7l In 
that context, it was easy to put those seeking asylum in one 
category or the other and to grant or deny asylum accordingly. 
164 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2008 Global 
Trends 2, June 16,2009, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 This is not to suggest that these countries are exemplars of human rights. 
Often it is in the country's best interest to classify people as refugees in order to get 
United Nations funding, regardless of the person's exact status. 
166 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1169 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[AJ 
bright-line rule excluding all persecutors - whether acting under coercion or not -
might still be the best way for the agency to effectuate the statutory scheme."). 
169 Id. at 1169-70. ("Immigration judges already face the overwhelming task of 
attempting to recreate, by a limited number of witnesses speaking through (often poor-
quality) translation, events that took place years ago in foreign, usually impoverished 
countries.") . 
170 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) ("There is obviously some 
ambiguity in a term like 'well-founded fear' which can only be given concrete meaning 
through a process of case-by-case adjudication."). 
171 Lori K. Walls, The Persecutor Bar in U.S. Immigration Law: Toward a More 
Nuanced Understanding of Modern "Persecution" in the Case of Forced Abortion and 
Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'y J. 227, 228 (2007). 
25
Johns: Adjusting the Asylum Bar
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010
260 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
In that framework, a bright-line rule made sense. But today, 
applying the persecutor bar to people whose actions bear no 
resemblance to those of the Nazis has become extremely 
complex because the majority of refugees in the world are 
"fleeing from civil conflicts in which the distinction between 
oppressor and oppressed is often unclear.,,172 Asylum 
proceedings need to account for this modern reality. Since a 
hearing must already be held to establish that the applicant 
has in fact persecuted others, a bright-line rule barring that 
applicant from raising a defense is unlikely to either save 
judicial resources or promote uniformity. 
III. SOLUTION 
The current definition of "refugee" is both under- and over-
inclusive: it bars those who assisted or participated in 
persecution but allows entry for those who have a higher level 
of culpability but who have not persecuted another person on 
account of one of the enumerated grounds. l73 To combat the 
over-inclusiveness, a broader reading of the persecutor bar 
should be implemented that includes a defense of duress in 
limited circumstances. 
When the BIA reevaluates Negusie's case, it should 
consider adopting the approach that other countries take when 
deciding whether to admit claimants accused of persecution 
who assert a defense of duress. An approach similar to those 
adopted by Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom would be reasonable: a "totality of the circumstances" 
approach to determining personal culpability that would 
require the BIA to issue rulings on a case-by-case basis. 
Factors the BIA should consider include: 1) the degree of 
assistance the alien gave in the persecution of others, 2) 
whether the alien was acting to avoid a threat of death or 
serious bodily injury, 3) whether the harm inflicted was less 
than the harm avoided, and 4) whether the alien escaped as 
172 Matthew Rappold, Excluding Children from Refugee Status: Child Soldiers 
and Article IF of the Refugee Convention, 17 AM. u. INT'L L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2002) 
(citing OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 
REFUGEES By NUMBERS 8 (2000». 
173 Lori K. Walls, The Persecutor Bar in U.S. Immigration Law: Toward a More 
Nuanced Understanding of Modern 'Persecution" in the Case of Forced Abortion and 
Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'y J. 227, 240 (2007). 
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soon as possible. 
Additionally, although the Supreme Court's remand of 
Negusie to the BIA required that the BIA adopt a "reasonable" 
interpretation, the Court did not provide any specific criteria 
for satisfying this requirement. 
This lack of guidance is highly likely to lead to continued 
conflicting interpretations among the circuits. Therefore, 
pending a new ruling from the BIA, Congress should amend 
INA § 101(a)(42) to specifically include duress as a defense. 
Congress should redefine "refugee" so the persecutor bar 
includes a statutory defense of duress, to avoid confusion and 
promote uniformity between the BIA and the courts of appeals. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The lines between persecutor and persecuted are no longer 
as easily defined as they were between the Nazis and their 
victims.174 Modern conflicts involve many actors, complex 
situations, and both state and private factions. 175 The U.N. 
recognizes over thirty ongoing conflicts around the world, in 
which over 250,000 people have been coerced into participating 
in violent armed conflicts. 176 The U.S. policy for accepting 
asylum applicants should reflect this modern context and 
include exceptions for those who have persecuted others under 
174 Jennifer C. Everett, The Battle Continues: Fighting for a More Child-Sensitive 
Approach to Asylum for Child Soldiers, 21 FLA. J. INT'L L. 285, 331 (2009). 
175 UNITED NATIONS GENERAL AsSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL FOR CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT, 
11 U.N. A1611275 (Aug. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.un.org!galsearchlview_doc.asp?symbol=A1611275&Lang=E. 
176 [d. This report focuses on child soldiers who are coerced into participating in 
armed conflicts. Specifically, the report focuses on conflicts in: Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, the Philippines, Colombia and Haiti. See also Thomas K. Ragland, AMERICAN 
BAR AsSOCIATION, Supreme Court Strikes Down Long-Standing BIA Interpretation of 
"Persecutor Bar" (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committeeslimmigration/articlesl0309_ragland.html 
(noting that among those most likely to be affected if a duress defense is read into the 
persecutor bar are "Iraqis who held civil service jobs at any time during the 24-year 
reign of Saddam Hussein, many of whose refugee claims have been denied or simply 
shelved by U.S. consular officials; Burmese nationals who have participated in the 
long-standing ethnic insurgency against that country's brutal military junta, and as a 
consequence classed as persecutors; civilians in Ethiopia or Liberia or Peru who were 
forced--sometimes at gunpoint--to fight or engage in violent acts during their country's 
civil wars; and many others across the globe"). 
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duress. 
Without allowing a defense of duress, the persecutor bar 
would instead continue to treat victims as the perpetrators of 
crimes. Daniel Negusie exemplifies this paradox. The United 
States, as a fierce international champion of human rights, 
must reconsider the harsh effect of an absolute persecutor bar 
and adopt a statutory defense of duress in INA § lOl(a)(42). 
Only by guaranteeing asylum applicants the right to raise a 
duress defense to the persecutor bar will we be able to ensure 
equal access to asylum for those fleeing from dangerous 
situations around the world and hoping to find a safe haven in 
the land of liberty. 
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